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I have always been somewhat suspicious of attempts to theorize money in linguistic terms.
Though the symbolic and conventional aspects of money make a parallel with language seem
attractive, such attempts usually refrain from considering the consequences of the fact that
money belongs to the order of private property, which is strictly opposed to the common
sphere of language. Wouldn’t conceiving of money as language force us to confront the
abhorrent, monstrous possibility of words that can be owned?
This is the great achievement of Martijn Konings’ The Emotional Logic of Capitalism
(2015), which conceptualizes money as an icon. In doing so he draws on the religious meaning
of the term — a symbol that represents through absence what cannot be represented — as well
as from its place in Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotic theory, where it denotes a sign
grounded in a similarity to what it signifies (see Pierce, 1998/1894). The full significance of
this attempt becomes clear in the last chapter of the book, where Konings addresses the
deepest political-economic riddle of our time: the sweeping victory of neoliberalism. Given that
the neoliberal order is harmful to the material prosperity of most people, many tend to think it
was established ‘from above’ by an alliance of capitalists, politicians, economic think tanks,
and the media. Konings confronts the mystery that such explanations evade — namely, how
did those people whose prosperity it so clearly threatens come to embrace neoliberalism?
What Konings shows is that the controversies between progressive and neoconservative
speakers in the United States were pre-decided in favor of the latter. On a discursive level,
these opposing camps may have appeared to represent two equally valid and legitimate
worldviews. But there was no real equality between them, because while the neoliberal
position spoke the language of money, the progressives tried in vain to repudiate it, speaking
in a language purified of money. In advocating for policies of privatization, marketization,
deregulation, or the reduction of political interference in the economy, the neoliberals did
much more than introduce an economic agenda. They tapped into the way money has carried
an ethical weight from the earliest days of the United States, as well as how this was pivotal to
the construction of a distinctly American subjectivity.
That is what the idea of money as icon entails. An icon is a paradoxical sign. It embodies
its meaning. It immediately conveys meaning, though this meaning remains elusive. We just
‘get’ it. It “has the curious capacity to signify metonymically, to express a constellation of which
it is a mere part” (Konings, 2015: 3). Seeing money as an icon, and not just as a symbolic
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convention, means that in engaging with money, people do much more than economists would
have us think. In borrowing or lending, in making money or spending it, people don’t just
satisfy needs, but take part in the American community. To buy or to sell, to borrow or repay
your debts, was always more than a private matter: it was a way to be a part of something
larger. It was a part of what being American was about. The neoliberals spoke the language of
money in the sense that their agenda echoed how money was pivotal in the early American
ethos of self-reliance and purifying austerity. The progressives, by contrast, strived to defend
society from the corrupting power of money. In so doing, they disavowed the way American
society was organized from its beginning by the money icon. During the first decades of the
United States, it was the progressive speakers who promoted the expansion of bank credit to
make it available to small farmers. They saw in it a potential for democratization, for liberation
from the ills of corrupt European society.
To return to the question of money and language, the idea of the icon enables more than
just the drawing of parallels, which is always somewhat futile. Rather than showing that money
is like a language, the icon shows how language, in capitalism, is monetized. It does not reach
the monstrous possibility of words that are owned, but it does get close to it. It shows how
certain words may have more or less purchasing power according to their proximity to money.
In The Communist Postscript, Boris Groys (2010: xvi) writes that one cannot argue with money:
“Economic processes are anonymous, and not expressed in words … one cannot enter into
discussion with economic processes”. That is how he distinguishes capitalist societies from
the late communist state, which was committed to rhetoric. A simple way to understand Groys’
claim is that money and the economy are just facts. One cannot argue with economic
processes just as one cannot argue with the weather. With Konings, though, we can find
another meaning in Groys’ claim: one cannot argue with money not because it is a brute fact,
but because it speaks in a particular way. It is a mute object, yet it structures discourse,
rendering some arguments empty speech while charging others with unbeatable force.
Konings’ argument about the role money that plays in the creation of community seems
very close to what economic thought has always had to say. After all, Adam Smith’s ‘invisible
hand’ also implied that in their economic, self-serving conduct, people are propelling a social
machine that enhances collective prosperity; that in their self-serving conduct they form a
community. In The Specter of Capital (2015), Joseph Vogl finds in this idea the initial form of
what he terms an oikodicy: a secularized theodicy, which can never be fully freed from its
theological origins. During more than two centuries of economic thought and history, this initial
form of oikodicy goes through numerous reformulations that make it appear ever more
scientific: market equilibrium, theories of competition, theories of finance as mitigating risk,
and so on. But as Vogl shows, the theological residue remains active. The notion of
equilibrium, of a machine that in spite of its growing complexity operates by a benign logic that
transcends the limited perspectives of human beings — this notion is never proven, but it
nevertheless serves as an assumption that informs economic argumentation, even when it is
hidden beneath thick layers of mathematical signs.
How can we distinguish Smith’s notion of the invisible hand from the critical perspectives
on it in works such as those of Vogl and Konings? The answer is somewhat paradoxical.
Smith’s invisible hand, as well as its more technical successors, can be considered scientific
as long as human action is indeed truly egotistic, governed by an unmitigated search for
solipsistic well being. That is why the science of economics purged itself of any possibility of
viewing human action as inherently social. One sees this in the transformation of the idea that
in the economy, private vices are turned into public virtues. In the original, pre-economic
formulation of this idea — Mandeville’s (2007/1732) Fable of the Bees — ‘envy’ can still be
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said to propel the economy. But affects like envy, being too social, were omitted from Smith’s
reformulation of the same idea in his metaphor of the invisible hand.
This makes economics both a very peculiar science and a very peculiar religion. It is a
religion that demands that its subjects do not believe. And it is a science of human action
predicated on real people’s obliviousness to its own knowledge. It is when economic conduct
is explicitly or implicitly social that its theological residues resurface. When a person sees his
self-seeking conduct as contributing to the welfare of society, or as a way of belonging to
community, he already diverges from the solipsistic assumptions of economics as a science
and practices it as a religious dogma. When a capitalist invokes Smith to justify himself by
saying that in seeking his own good he contributes to the good of society, he is no longer the
Smithian subject on which economic knowledge came to be modelled.
One of Vogl’s great achievements is to demonstrate that various stages in the growing
‘financialization’ of money have a dual nature. Money comes to rely on increasingly
complicated, counterintuitive mechanisms, but these are designed to maintain the most basic
qualities we expect from it in its everyday use. Similarly, money is distanced from goods and
the ‘real economy’ even as it penetrates more deeply into the fabric of society. In 1797, the
absolution of the Bank of England from its obligation to change bank notes back into coins
could not but be perceived as a scandalous act. In an economy where gold backed the value
of money, people were forced to accept mere paper as payments. But in this way, money could
maintain one of its most basic features: liquidity. It opened the way to the creation of money
based on credit, and this allegedly technical innovation fundamentally changed the social
nature of money. By allowing people to pay with a promise of money, by equating money with a
claim to money, it inscribed social relations and ethical characteristics more deeply within the
money object. It changed the very nature of wealth: “Now everyone can own something only ‘to
the extent that he is owned in turn’”, writes Vogl (2015: 54). Almost two hundred years later,
with the dissolution of the gold standard, the most arcane financial mechanisms were
instituted again to maintain the solidity of money. In the absence of secure exchange rates
between currencies, derivatives and future trading were instituted in order to mitigate the risks
of international commerce.
In his introduction to this forum, Amin Samman (2015: 24) wonders "how the arcane
workings of high-tech finance relate to the emotional logics of everyday life in capitalist
societies"; "Can the magical worlds of money work without a wider audience that ultimately
believes in magic?" I think that Konings and Vogl point us to a more enigmatic formulation of
this question. Vogl shows how the solidity of money, its unproblematic, mundane guise in
everyday life, is dependent on the growing ephemerality and mysteriousness of the financial
mechanisms that accompany it. And vice versa too: financial profits, which create money out
of thin air, are dependent on money’s solid appearance in everyday life. Meanwhile, Konings
shows us that this rift between mundane money and its financial shadow must leave its marks
on everyday life. As an icon, money is something more than its mundane uses, and in this
elusive surplus, religious echoes interplay with economic agendas.
Konings also shows how, in the neoliberal economy, new forms of the old republican ethic
are once again entangled with money. Self-help books, to take one example among many,
justify the pursuit of wealth, and present wealth (once again) as a sign of personal virtue and
authenticity. To get at the magic of money, I suggest taking a stroll down the path of modern
spirituality. Rhonda Byrne’s bestselling book, The Secret (2006), whose main theme is the
infinite abundance of the Universe, may seem the farthest thing possible from the world of
economy, which – we are told – is a world based on scarcity. Yet it can be read as the theology
of money in an age of neoliberal finance. It is focused on self-realization, yet its hyperbolic
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language of abundance makes self-realization the twin of infinite frustration. It is the logic of
money, of which there is never enough, that makes possible such a coupling of infinite
abundance and frustration. At the same time, the book follows the logic of finance as it erases
the difference between the imagined and the real, equating riches with the expectation of
riches. As Byrne (2006: 98) writes: “To attract money, you must focus on wealth. It is
impossible to bring more money into your life when you are noticing you do not have enough”.
That is precisely how Vogl (2015: 111) characterizes the finance economy: “Profit has to
be imagined before it can be reaped”. But Byrne’s most important ‘secret’ is the articulation of
the language of realization and abundance with a new ethic of self-discipline inscribed in
money. This kitschy spirituality of wealth would appear quite far from early capitalism’s ethos
of austerity. But the figure of hyperbolic abundance only underscores the extreme form of the
self-disciplinary ethic it enfolds. What we find here is the totalitarian, paranoid nature of the
idea of positive thinking, the figure of infinite abundance become infinite, cosmic guilt: “When
you focus your thoughts on something you want, and you hold that focus, you are in that
moment summoning what you want with the mightiest power in the Universe” (Byrne, 2006:
14). The law of attraction doesn't compute ‘don’t’, ‘not’, or ‘no’, or any other words of negation.
As you speak words of negation, this is what the law of attraction is receiving:
‘I don't want to spill something on this outfit’
‘I want to spill something on this outfit and I want to spill more things'
‘I don't want this person to be rude to me’
‘I want that person and more people to be rude to me'
What is remarkable here is the way a hedonistic self-centered manifesto takes the form of
hysterical conformism. The Universe itself cruelly punishes those who let a negative thought
pass through their heads. That is how money speaks today: fantasies of boundless wealth,
fashioning subjects who cannot say ‘no’.
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